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Limits of Force-based Strategies and Institution-
Building: a Focus on Border Spaces in the Security 
Puzzle  
Simbal Khan and Helena Rytövuori-Apunen 
In response to the events of 9/11, the U.S. and its international coalition used 
military force almost reflexively to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the 
Taliban government and its associated networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
As the Taliban resurged in 2004–20061 from their sanctuaries in the border 
areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it was widely believed that it was 
the lack of regional governments’ capacity to launch effective 
counterterrorism operations and to police their borders which fueled 
transborder militancy.2 Afghanistan, along with its Central Asian neighbors, 
as well as Pakistan, received high levels of support to undertake large-scale 
security sector upgrades. 
This chapter argues that force-based strategies have achieved certain re-
sults during the last fourteen years: counterterror strategies such as kill-
capture campaigns have been successful in decimating foreign al-Qaeda-
related actors from South-Central Asia.3 However, the success of such opera-
tions is limited and short-term in their effect when applied against transbor-
der militants due to a failure to account for the dynamic nature of these ac-
tors. Unlike foreign al-Qaeda elements, these forces are linked to the ever-
changing socio-political and economic dynamics within the border spaces in
which they operate. Use of excessive military force against them within their
larger communities has accelerated societal change and concomitantly
changed the very nature of these groups. The Pakistani military’s initial de-
ployment to the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region in
                                                          
1 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in 
Afghanistan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2007): 94, 98. 
2 Sergey Golunov, “Border Security in Central Asia: Before and After September 11,” 
Austrian Federal Ministry of Defense, April 2005, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=91419.
3 “Obama: Taliban, al-Qaeda Diminished in Afghanistan,” Jerusalem Post, December 16, 
2010, http://www.jpost.com/International/Obama-Taliban-al-Qaida-diminished-
in-Afghanistan; also see Dave Boyer, “Obama: Al Qaeda ‘On the Way to Defeat’,”
Washington Times, August 7, 2013, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/7/obama-al-qaeda-way-defeat/. 
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2004, and the continuous military operations of the past ten years, has given
birth to the Pakistani Taliban, an umbrella group of more than thirty smaller
groups resisting the Pakistani state.4 Simultaneously the on-going war and
conflict in border spaces has limited the political and institutional outreach of
governments in these areas. Several border districts in Afghanistan have no
permanent civilian government presence due to poor security.5 In Pakistan,
military operations in border zones over the last ten years have weakened
established governing institutions and marginalized the role of the Political
Agent (PA), which previously headed the civilian administration in FATA.6
While the establishment of border crossing points provide legalized
channels to some of the people and goods that flow across the border, border
management alone cannot possibly significantly diminish the illegal flows
and control the movement of insurgent groups between Afghanistan and Pa-
kistan. Control of the approximately 2,600-kilometer-long border is a daunt-
ing task for a number of technical and political reasons, not least because the
administrative reforms and measures on the Afghan side are insufficient un-
less they are mirrored by similar structures on the Pakistani side. Even after
more than a decade of border management and security sector reform, Af-
ghan Taliban still manage to travel unimpeded through the border zone be-
tween Pakistan and Afghanistan.7 The Pakistani Taliban offshoot, Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has in fact grown to develop its own capacity for
transborder operations.8 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) remnants
have been able to shift between Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal
                                                          
4 Jayshree Bajoria and Jonathan Masters, “Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists,” Council 
on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, September 26, 2012,
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-new-generation-terrorists/p15422.
5 Fabrizio Foschini, “One Year of Transition: A Look Back,” Afghanistan Analysts Network,
March 18, 2012, http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/one-year-of-transition-a-look-back-1/ 
and http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/one-year-of-transition-a-look-back-2/.
6 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA,” Asia Report, no. 
178 (October 21, 2009), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia/pakistan/178_pakistan___counteri
ng_militancy_in_fata.pdf; also see Zulfiqar Ali, “Political Administration Not Prepared to 
Replace the Army in FATA,” Dawn, December 16, 2013,
http://www.dawn.com/news/1074269.
7 Zia Ur Rehman, “Taliban Militants Striking Pakistan from Afghan Territory,” Combating 
Terrorism Center, September 26, 2012, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/taliban-militants-
striking-pakistan-from-afghan-territory.
8 S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamic Militancy in
South Asia,” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012):134–135.
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Areas and northern Afghanistan and into Tajikistan,9 which has facilitated
their connections with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. While the border
spaces obviously are a test of the capability and willingness of neighboring
and regional states to cooperate with each other, they also are the ultimate
test of the sustainability and determination of the policies of the international
community to build up peace and stability in and around Afghanistan.   
International Security Assistance and the War on Terror
According to a Congressional Research Service report released in August 
2015, the U.S. has provided about $100 billion to Afghanistan since the 
change of the government in Kabul in autumn 2001, of which about 60 
percent has been for “train and equip” missions for the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), including the ANA (Afghan National Army) and 
ANP (Afghan National Police).10 Since 2010, Afghanistan has seen an 
immense expansion of its military and police forces designed as substitutes 
for the anticipated departure of international troops. By September 2012, the 
ANSF had grown to 352,000 troops; and this number has become the rough 
standard for the post-withdrawal situation.11 At the Tokyo summit held in 
July 2012, the U.S., NATO, and other donors pledged $16 billion over four 
years, from 2012 to 2015, amounting to $4.1 billion per year in security 
sector support. Later, this support was extended to continue beyond 2015, 
initially for the next two years and subsequently until the end of 2020.12
                                                          
9 Frank Shanty, The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan
(Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 128; and see Matthew Stein, “Uzbekistan’s View of Secu-
rity in Afghanistan After 2014,” Military Review 92, no. 3 (May–June 2012): 75–76, 78.
10 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, August 17, 2015, summary,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf. The plan for 2016 is $5.3 billion, of which 
$3.8 billion for the ANSF (ibid.). These figures do not include the cost of U.S. combat 
operations, which is estimated to be around $686 billion from October 2001 to December 
2014 (Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror 
Operations Since 9/11,” CRS Report, December 8, 2014, summary,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf).
11 Katzman, “Afghanistan,” 31.
12 The Tokyo Conference took place on July 8, 2012. It was an international meeting to 
discuss strategy and financial support for Afghanistan’s security and its political and 
economic development beyond 2014 in anticipation of the U.S. military withdrawal from 
the region. See Anthony Cordesman, “Afghanistan and the Tokyo Conference: Hope, 
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Pakistan also began to receive unprecedented levels of security sector 
assistance from the U.S. after it joined the U.S.-led coalition as a “frontline 
ally” in 2001. For the period of 2002–2013, it received approximately $25 
billion, out of which around $17 billion was security assistance, including 
$10.7 billion packaged as Coalition Support Funds (CSF).13 The CSF 
funding reimburses Pakistan for costs incurred by the military during its 
counterterror and counter-insurgency operations on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border. By June 2015, CSF funding amounted to $13 billion and the 
authorization for the next fiscal year (until end June 2016) was $1.5 billion.14
By comparison, U.S. security assistance to Central Asian states has been 
far smaller but has increased significantly since September 2001,15 despite 
congressional restrictions on U.S. security assistance to governments with 
human rights violations (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example).16 By the 
end of 2001, the U.S. had negotiated with the governments of Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan to station military troops on their territory and gained access 
to the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan as well as the Manas airbase in 
Kyrgyzstan.17 Between 2001 and 2005 the United States Army, Air Force 
and Marine Corps maintained the military base in Karshi-Khanabad (also 
known as K2 and “Stronghold Freedom”) for support missions against al-
Qaeda in neighboring Afghanistan. Under a joint declaration titled “Strategic 
                                                                                                                            
Fantasy, and Failure,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 9, 2012, 
http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-and-tokyo-conference-hope-fantasy-and-failure; also 
see Thomas Ruttig, “Jumble of Figures: How much money came out of Tokyo?,” 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 9, 2012, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/jumble-
of-figures-how-much-money-came-out-of-tokyo/; also see “Afghanistan Aid: Donors 
Pledge $16bn at Tokyo Meeting,” BBC, July 8, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-18758148. On December 1, 2015, the foreign ministers of the NATO member states
agreed on the need to secure funding for the ANSF until the end of 2020. North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125364.htm.
13 K. Alan Kronstadt and Susan Epstein, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and
Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–FY2014,” Congressional Research Service,
April 11, 2013, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/207789.pdf.
14 Ibid.; “Pakistan Gets $336m  in Coalition Support Fund, Foreign Reserves Climb to 
$19bn,” Dawn, Karachi, July 28, 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1196920/pakistan-gets-
336m-in-coalition-support-fund-foreign-reserves-climb-to-19bn.
15 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, November 20, 2013, 50–51,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/218963.pdf.
16 Ibid, 53; also see Roger N. McDermott, Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy: An Assessment of the 
Trends, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 13, 17, 22.
17 Jeffrey Mankoff, “The United States and Central Asia After 2014,” Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, January 2013, 3, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Mankoff_USCentralAsia_Web.pdf.
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Partnership and Cooperation” (2002) the U.S. also assured Uzbekistan of its 
commitment to destroying IMU bases in northern Afghanistan.18 The U.S.-
Uzbekistan military and security partnership unraveled in autumn 2005, but 
as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) was expanded half a decade 
later, the U.S. began re-engaging Uzbekistan by first providing modest non-
military security assistance (subsequent developments are discussed by 
Vadim Romashov in this book).19 The U.S. continued to use the Manas 
airbase in Kyrgyzstan for troop deployment and logistical purposes until late 
spring 2014. ISAF also established direct military cooperation with 
Tajikistan, which has included refueling operations for coalition aircraft, 
hosting a small contingent of French jets at Dushanbe airport, and allowing 
coalition aircraft to cross its territory. Additionally, the Central Asian states, 
and especially Tajikistan with its 1,340-kilometer-long border with 
Afghanistan, have received multilateral assistance to improve the security 
and management of their borders. Since 2003, the Central Asia Border 
Security Initiative (CABSI) has functioned as a coordinating forum that 
brings together the EU, U.S., Russia, China, Japan and Turkey as well as a 
wide range of global organizations to discuss border-related issues with the 
five Central Asian states and Afghanistan. The prime motor in this activity 
has been the Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) program which 
was initiated by the European Commission in 2003. BOMCA was allocated 
€36.5 million for the period of 2003–2014, out of which €33.6 million was 
provided directly by the European Commission. An additional €5 million has 
been allocated for the period 2014–2017.20 Such programs proclaim broad-
                                                          
18 Nichol, “Central Asia,” 16; also see Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s Security: Issues and 
Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, April 26, 
2007, 25–26, 31–33, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=473486.
19 Daniil Kislov, “U.S. Ambassador in Uzbekistan George Krol: ‘We Recognize Democracy 
May Develop and Look Differently in Uzbekistan’,” Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 
25, 2012, http://www.turkishweekly.net/2012/09/25/news/us-ambassador-in-uzbekistan-
george-krol-we-recognize-democracy-may-develop-and-look-differently-in-uzbekistan/; 
also see U.S. Department of State, “State’s Blake on U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” U.S. 
Embassy Bishkek, October 18, 2012, http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/states-blake-on-us-
policy-in-central-asia-october-22-2012.html.
20 CABSI was founded in 2003 by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior as a platform 
for dialogue and discussion on border management activities in Central Asia. Each year the 
CABSI Consortium meets to review the progress of BOMCA with its five Central Asia 
partner countries. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is the implementation 
agency for BOMCA for the EU along with the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD) as an implementing partner. European Commission’s Directorate-
General for International Cooperation and Development, “Central Asia––Border 
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based political support; however, the sums received by the individual Central 
Asian states are seven-digit in comparison with the billions allocated for 
Afghanistan. Among the largest items of non-military assistance is the U.S. 
support for improving the capabilities of the Drug Control Agency in 
Tajikistan, which amounted to several millions of dollars in 2015.21
Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
In Afghanistan, the civilian assistance provided by the U.S. alone between 
2001–2014 has amounted to $37.4 billion, and a further, almost equivalent 
sum has come from other sources. Besides reconstruction of physical 
infrastructure, a substantial amount of this assistance has flowed into 
rebuilding Afghanistan’s governmental institutions, improving its rule of law 
and governance, and boosting its political structures, including its electoral 
system. Pakistan has also received enhanced assistance for its civilian sectors 
from the U.S. and other donors. Non-military assistance from the U.S. during 
2002–2014 totalled $9.3 billion.22 Civilian aid to Afghanistan accelerated 
during 2010–2014, generally doubling aid figures from the middle of the last 
decade. In Pakistan this peaked in 2010, after the U.S. Congress approved 
the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act in 2009, and then stabilized in 
modest declines for each subsequent year.23
                                                                                                                            
management,” accessed June 6, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/central-
asia/eu-support-border-management-central-asia_en.
21 The U.S. Central Command has provided more than $130 million in assistance to law 
enforcement agencies in Tajikistan since 2007. “US Embassy Dushanbe Provides Tactical  
Equipment to Tajikistan’s Agencies Involved in Counter-narcoti [sic],” Asia-Plus,
Dushanbe, August 12, 2015, http://www.news.tj/en/news/us-embassy-dushanbe-provides-
tactical-equipment-tajikistan-s-agencies-involved-counter-narcoti; also see Embassy of the 
United States, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/index.html.
22 A great majority of direct overt aid to Pakistan is in the form of Economic Support Funds 
(ESF). Katzman, “Afghanistan,” 72, 75; K. Alan Kronstadt and Susan Epstein, “Direct 
Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–
FY2016,” Congressional Research Service, September 30, 2015, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf.
23 Simultaneously the share of economic-related assistance to Pakistan has increased in 
relation to security-related assistance. This was the rationale of the Enhanced Partnership 
for Pakistan Act (commonly known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, KLB), which sought 
to untie economic-related aid from security issues and thus make it more stable. The act 
authorized a tripling of U.S. economic and development-related assistance to Pakistan ($7.5 
billion over five years, FY2010 to FY2014). Center for Global Development, “Aid to 
Pakistan by the Numbers,” accessed June 10, 2015, http://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-
pakistan-numbers.
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This enhancement in civilian assistance occurred in parallel to the on-
going war in Afghanistan and military operations in Pakistan’s border zones. 
The underlying political rationale of civilian assistance in this instance is that 
better governance, especially at the district and local levels, would increase 
state capacity in providing goods and services to the people and thereby 
reduce the popularity of groups such as the Taliban. In 2009–2010, more 
than 70 percent of USAID civilian assistance flowed into Taliban-dominated 
war zones in southern and eastern Afghanistan.24 However, initial optimism 
about the possibilities to build administrative, educational, and business 
infrastructure even in the remote areas began to fade over the course of the 
decade, partly for reasons commonly related to development assistance: the 
lack of local infrastructure fit for the allocation of funds as well as a socio-
cultural environment in which it was difficult to operate without engaging in 
practices such as those pertaining to bribery amongst law enforcement 
officials. However, there was also a more specific reason: large counter-
insurgency operations of “clear, hold and build”25 launched in southern and 
eastern Afghanistan in 2009 did not decimate the Taliban. Instead, they 
served to push fighters across the border into Pakistan’s tribal belt in order to 
regroup and reorganize. 
Multilateral Support Structures 
In international non-military cooperation on Afghanistan the concentration of 
efforts on rebuilding political institutions and governance structures with 
external assistance has obscured political and cultural dimensions and aspects 
of local politics that have sustained the support for the Taliban and its 
networks, especially within the border communities.26 The political approach 
to rebuilding the post-Taliban Afghan state has been two-pronged: the 
                                                          
24 Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Julie Walz, “CERP in Afghanistan: Refining 
Civilian Capabilities in Development Activities,” Prism 3, no. 2 (2012): 82–85.
25 “Interview: McChrystal Says Solution in Afghanistan is Developing Governance,” Radio
Free Europe/Radion Liberty, June 30, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_US_
Commander_In_Afghanistan_Says_Real_Solution_Is_Developing_Governance/1765881.ht
ml; also see U.S. Department of Defense, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” news release, 
Washington Post, September 21, 2009, http://media.washingtonpost.com/
wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews.
26 Siegfried Wolf, “Taliban and Democracy: The Unequal Equation,” Panorama, June 28, 
2013.
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international community has assisted in building political institutions as well 
as the massive reconstruction process within Afghanistan and Pakistan; and 
institution-building practices have been extended to the region as a whole in 
order to promote region-wide inter-state cooperation. Since 2001, this has 
been the focus of many noteworthy political initiatives. The Bonn 1 process 
in 200127 created optimism for the future of regional cooperation centered on 
Afghanistan. All of Afghanistan’s neighbors, as well as other regional actors 
such as India, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states, cooperated with Afghan and 
international actors to produce the framework for the reformed Afghan state. 
With the beginning of President Obama’s first term in 2009, there was a 
renewed focus on reviving regional initiatives that created new diplomatic 
instruments, such as the “Contact Group” and a regional security and 
economic cooperation forum.28 International diplomacy focused on creating 
various trilateral and multilateral platforms within the region, with 
Afghanistan as a centerpiece. 
The most well-known initiative to revive regional cooperation is the 14-
member “Istanbul Process.”29 Also known as the “Heart of Asia,” it was
launched in Istanbul in November 2011. Initially, the Istanbul conference
was designed as a platform for developing regional arrangements to support
the security of Afghanistan after 2014. The Afghans, in particular, demanded
binding guarantees about mutual non-interference under the aegis of the
United Nations that would start the process of shutting down insurgent safe
havens beyond Afghan borders. Because the proposal was rejected during the
initial stages of negotiation, it remains unclear what precisely it was that the
Afghan delegation was proposing. While some sources suggest that the Af-
ghans were hoping to set up a structure similar to the OSCE (Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan re-
                                                          
27 Afghanistan Government, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” accessed June 10, 
2015, http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm.
28 Office of the President, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S.
Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” March 2009, 2,  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.
29 The “Heart of Asia” Ministerial Conference Declaration, “Istanbul Process: Stability and 
Prosperity in the ‘Heart of Asia’ through Building Confidence and Shared Regional 
Interests,” April 26, 2013, http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/19668; also see U.S. Department of 
State, “State’s Blake in Kazakhstan on Istanbul Process,” April 26, 2013, http://iipdigital.
usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04/20130429146581.html#axzz2j7GGZNWd.
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jected the draft declaration even before the conference began.30 In rejecting
this new arrangement, which had originally been proposed by the U.S., other
Western countries and India, the government of Pakistan maintained that
regional security issues could be handled within existing regional frame-
works such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).31 At the Ufa
summit meeting held in July 2015, both India and Pakistan entered the pro-
cess to become full and permanent members of the SCO.32  
The founding members of the SCO (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) as well as the new members, India 
and Pakistan, all face varying challenges from militant organizations. 
Chinese authorities see Uighur militant groups such as ETIM in northern 
Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s tribal belt as a separatist threat in Xinjiang 
province, which links China with Central Asia and farther afield to Europe 
through geo-economic strategies under construction (see the contribution by 
Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä in this book). Muslim Uighurs originating 
from Xinjiang have found sanctuaries within co-ethnic communities in 
Central Asia and, increasingly, in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Central 
Asian states have all faced the threat of the transborder Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan and its offshoot, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and since 2014 
the support given by the Islamic State to this regional insurgency has been 
renewing fears that had been fading about the presence of al-Qaeda within 
the region. Russia has had a long history of conflict with Chechen and 
Dagestani rebels, who move around within the region seeking resources and 
support from other regional militants.33
However, the expectation that the SCO could develop region-wide 
cooperation in order to counter these threats is likely to remain only wishful 
speculation. This is because, firstly, inter-state disputes over conflicted 
borders and natural resources such as water still impact relations between the 
countries. Secondly, the politics of transborder militants is intertwined with 
                                                          
30 Thomas Ruttig, “Afghanistan Conference in Istanbul: The clogged arteries of the ‘Heart of
Asia’,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 1, 2011, https://www.afghanistan-
analysts.org/afghanistan-conference-in-istanbul-the-clogged-arteries-of-the-heart-of-asia/.
31 Yousaf Kamran, “Pakistan to Attend Istanbul Conference with Low Expectations,” The 
Express Tribune, October 31, 2011.
32 “Pakistan, India, join Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Dawn, July 11, 2015,
http://www.dawn.com/news/1193717.
33 Alexander Shlyndov, “Certain Aspects of Russian-Chinese Collaboration in the 
International Arena,” Far Eastern Affairs 34, no. 2 (2006): 68–81. 
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the histories of these borders and how state practices are developed to 
achieve state interests. From time to time such groups serve at least the 
tactical interests of regional states vis-à-vis neighboring states.34 Thirdly, the 
states cooperating in the frame of the SCO are generally reluctant to become 
engaged in developing multilateral cooperative structures that could restrict 
their sovereign decision-making. Therefore it cannot come as a surprise that 
the idea of creating a structure similar to the OSCE aroused the suspicions of 
Pakistan and other states. A region-wide security organization modelled on 
the OSCE remains unlikely in a region where countries resist maneuvering 
themselves into a restrictive framework akin to that experienced by 
Afghanistan. During the past ten years the OSCE had come under the 
criticism of Russia, Belarus and some other states, who had claimed that the 
organization’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) was promoting the political interests of the West through its 
election observance missions. The SCO, which was formed in 2001 by China 
and Russia on the basis of the Shanghai Five, was contrarily seen as a 
platform to develop policies in accordance with the governments’ 
preferences to confront threats such as radical Islam and transborder militant 
actors.35 The idea that institution-building practices could be extended to the 
region as a whole, and that such region-wide cooperation could open 
pathways in solving security problems, resonates with the Western 
experience of integration and can be easily presented as a design for 
politically appealing policy in international forums. However, the non-
institutional approach that is based on tradition and nowadays promoted as 
“Asian regionalism” within the region (see the contribution by Elnara 
Bainazarova in this book) may be a more realistic way to gain concrete 
results because it, in spite of perhaps being idealized for purposes of identity 
and prestige, is an already present, living tradition as well as a diplomatic 
practice to which the states are accustomed in their mutual cooperation. 
                                                          
34 Paul Ames, “Afghan governors call for more international aid for border regions,” 
Associated Press, May 7, 2008, http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Afghanistan_08_
05_07_Afghan_governors_call_for_more_international_aid_for_border_regions.doc.
35 Thomas Ambrosio, “Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 
8 (October 2008): 1334.
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Conclusion
Afghanistan since 2001 has made remarkable progress in institutional 
development in all primary state sectors, as a result of international support 
for the Afghan reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Its National 
Security Forces, in particular, are an important step in building Afghan 
sovereignty and state capacity in order to provide its population with a 
minimum degree of security once international forces withdraw. Yet, the 
international donor community has been slow to consider the consequences 
of the fact that the process of institution-building was undertaken almost 
entirely through the enormous infusion of external funds. In 2015, donor aid 
was estimated to account for more than 95 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP and 
at least two-thirds of its government expenditure.36 Therefore, the long-term 
sustainability of many of the institutions developed over the course of the last 
fourteen years in Afghanistan remains in question. 
While these issues cannot be avoided for as long as international funding 
continues, our focus has been a question that does not draw as much public 
attention. We argue that such institution-building has failed to address the 
problem of transborder militancy in the region, and that force-based 
approaches have in fact strengthened the dynamics causing the problem to 
worsen in the long term. In chapter 3 in this book, Simbal Khan discusses in 
detail the complex mechanism that has allowed transborder militant 
movements to survive within the conflict-laden spaces in South-Central and 
Central Asia. Both in Afghanistan and Pakistan these movements remain tied 
to the conflicted situation within border spaces. Furthermore, the presence of 
foreign troops has not made the central governments’ approaches to the 
populations in the border areas any gentler; contrarily, it has disrupted 
communities and served to prepare the ground for yet more conflict. 
Continued suppression, the experience of injustice, and economic plight 
prepare the ground in which local insurgency gathers strength and becomes 
receptive to regional and extra-regional jihadist connections. Although the 
public image of the coalition troops on the Afghan side differs greatly from 
the reports of the U.S. drone attacks on the Pakistani side, these are two sides 
of the same conflict. Broadcasts reveal little of the horrors of nocturnal raids 
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and the fear by which the ANSF, backed by foreign forces, rules these border 
areas. 
In the cases where it has been successful, the use of military force has 
been mostly limited to maintaining an uneasy status quo, evident for example 
in increased border fencing and the hardening of border controls by the 
Indian military to prevent infiltration by Kashmiri militants. Even here, 
however, the status quo seems to be uncertain, as border violations have 
increased since 2012.37 Our conclusion is, first, that while most interventions 
by international and regional actors in and around Afghanistan have relied on 
use of force strategies along with a focus on institution-building, this 
approach alone has failed to address persistent conflict involving border 
areas. Second, there is no other way but to contribute to economic and social 
development within conflicted and marginalized spaces around border areas. 
The main challenge here is less about resources than about gradual 
community development. These issues call for close cooperation between 
donor agencies and local communities as well as the use of regional 
governments’ own channels for development work, despite their propensity 
for corruption and other problems. Third, the long-term effects of policies of 
violence must be recognized. Whenever local populations’ sense of justice is 
violated by military operations in a situation where the possibility for 
retributive justice does not exist, these operations—the acts of the 
government-supported security forces, national and foreign—are likely to 
generate new cycles of violence. The dilemma is that where the rule of law 
does not exist and the state can violently disrupt the everyday lives of the 
people, the state itself—the concept of the unified national state, its army and 
other institutions—becomes part of the conflict and the source of violence. It 
remains impossible to establish rule of law and democracy—the Western 
concept of the state—by force in an environment where these ideas do not 
already exist and make a sensible difference in the lives of people but where, 
instead, experiences with the state are characterized by violence and 
repression. While this is a general problem that leads us to immanent 
criticism of Western approaches and juxtaposes idealist construction of 
society (ideas—reforms—are defined in one context and implemented in 
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another context)38 with pragmatist realism (ideas arise from the life-
experience to which they consequently apply), it is most acute in border 
spaces which draw in and shelter political dissent.  
To sum up, we find that a crucial piece of the puzzle in which 
development is thought to facilitate security will remain absent for as long as 
the international emphasis on greater regional cooperation as a means to 
build security in the post-withdrawal situation in and around Afghanistan 
continues to stall over the issue of transborder organization and its linkage to 
militant activity and jihadist causes. The agencies who participate in 
implementing the various region-wide designs for energy cooperation and 
other border-crossing projects, which are meant to enhance regional 
economic development, would do well to include direct benefits not only for 
population centers but also for border communities in their goals. A step 
forward would be that the donors—international development banks, 
organizations and countries—include the benefits generated for the border 
communities in the initial conditions of funding and require this item to be a 
part of impact assessment. This would also be a way to pressure regional 
governments to seriously consider the economic and social condition of their 
border communities. The challenge for the international community, then, is 
whether these issues can also open up space for wider forms of regional and 
international cooperation to alleviate the dire economic situation of border 
communities, and whether such cooperation can be sufficiently broad-based 
so as to also include the historical powers in the region, Russia among them. 
This is important in order to ensure that external actors will not support 
regional states along ethnic lines as has been the case in the past and, 
possibly, remains a tempting practice in conflict situations involving 
international rivalries. This, of course, brings the question of border spaces 
back to the political roots of the problem at hand, which is the question of 
ethnically and regionally inclusive government on different levels of 
administration. Border spaces are not just a “missing piece” that calls for our 
attention but a piece in a more comprehensive puzzle. 
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